



Benefit Corporation Legislation: An Opportunity 
for Kansas to Welcome Social Enterprises 
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has been marked with corporate scandals.  From 
Enron to the subprime mortgage crisis, the BP oil spill to the Massey 
Energy mine explosion, Americans have become increasingly 
disillusioned with corporations.
1
  At a time when unemployment rates are 
high and many Americans are struggling to make ends meet, the mere 
mention of “corporate America” brings to mind images of Wall Street fat 
cats lining their pockets with the hard-earned money of the less wealthy.  
Protestors involved in the Occupy Wall Street movement brought home 
the frustration and discontent with the “business as usual” attitude as 
they took to the streets to speak out against the traditional corporate 
culture of profit above all else.
2
 
In the midst of growing dissatisfaction with traditional corporate 
maxims, one organization has been working hard to change the corporate 
landscape and prove that corporations can do good and also do well.  B 
Lab, a Pennsylvania nonprofit, was founded in 2007 by three friends—
Jay Coen Gilbert, Bart Houlahan, and Andrew Kassoy—to provide 
support to businesses and entrepreneurs who create social and 
environmental benefits as well as make a profit.
3
  Gilbert and Houlahan 
are the original founders of AND1, a $250 million basketball footwear, 
apparel, and entertainment company.  Andrew Kassoy worked for 
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 1.  See The 2012 Harris Poll Annual RQ Public Summary Report, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 5 
(Feb. 2012), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/2012_Harris_Poll_RQ_Summary_Report.pdf 
(reporting that only two in ten Americans think corporate America has a positive reputation). 
 2.  Declaration of the Occupation of New York City, N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nycga.net/resources/declaration/.   
 3.  The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
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sixteen years in private equity before co-founding B Lab.
4
  First, B Lab 
created a certification process for socially minded businesses.  After 
recognizing the inadequacy of existing corporate law for social 
enterprises, the organization worked to draft model legislation to create a 
new kind of corporation—one that places social benefit above profit.
5
  A 
version of this model legislation has been adopted in nineteen states and 
the District of Columbia to date.
6
 
This Comment provides a critical look at benefit corporations, a new 
type of legal business form for businesses that are motivated to create 
social and environmental benefits as well as profits.  This Comment 
explains the evolution of and need for a business form that is 
unrestrained by the wealth maximization norms of traditional 
corporations.  It explains the main goals of benefit corporation legislation 
and its success thus far.  The benefits of adopting benefit corporation 
legislation are threefold.  First, it provides socially conscious and 
mission-driven companies with enhanced legal protection, especially in 
change of control scenarios, and a clear mandate of fiduciary duty. 
Second, it provides socially conscious, sustainable companies with 
legitimate branding as a company that “walks the walk” rather than only 
“talks the talk.”  Third, it provides additional financing opportunities, 
including patient capital, and has the potential to provide additional 
financial benefits as more states adopt the new entity form. 
This Comment also discusses criticisms of the legislation and provides 
context and counterpoints to the most persistent critiques.  Finally, this 
Comment addresses the need for benefit corporation legislation in Kansas 
and concludes that Kansas should adopt the legislation and the 
recommendations for select provisions provided.
7
 
                                                          
 4.  The GIIRS Team, GIIRS, http://giirs.org/about-giirs/giirs-team (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).  
 5.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION (Apr. 10, 2013), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf. 
 6.  State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (listing states 
that have adopted Benefit Corporation legislation to include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington D.C.). 
 7.  This Comment was born out of a short article about benefit corporations that was published 
in 2012. Anna R. Kimbrell, The Benefit Corporation: Can Changes to Corporate Law Change 
Business As Usual?, 1 MORAL CENTS 5, 5 (2012), http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Benefit-Corporation-Paper-SPI-revisions-.pdf. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. B Lab and B Corp Certification 
B Corp Certification and incorporation as a benefit corporation are 
not the same.
8
  A company may choose to incorporate as a benefit 
corporation in a state that recognizes it as a legal entity and may also 
become certified as a “B Corp,” or it may choose only one or the other.
9
  
It is not necessary for a company to be B Corp certified if it is 
incorporated as a benefit corporation, although B Corp status may add 
value.
10
  B Lab created the certification for businesses, much like the 
“Fair Trade” or “Organic” product certifications that consumers are 
familiar with, in an effort to aid consumers in differentiating between 
good companies and companies with good marketing.
11
  B Corp 
Certification is a certification for the company rather than the company’s 
individual products.  The certification process attempts to measure 
impact on non-shareholder stakeholders and scores each business on a 
range of categories in four primary impact areas: employees, consumers, 
the community, and the environment.
12
  Businesses scoring above a 
threshold number are eligible for B Corp Certification.
13
 
The certification effort has been quite successful.  At present, there 
are 910 certified B Corps in twenty-nine countries, representing 60 
                                                          
 8.  Passing Legislation: The Difference Between Benefit Corporations and Certified B Corps, 
BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2013).  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  WILLIAM H. CLARK ET AL., B-LAB, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION: WHY IT’S THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 3 (Jan. 18, 2013), [hereinafter 
BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER] available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_18_2013.pdf. 
 12.  Why Become a B Corp?, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-
a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). The definition of “stakeholder” is 
imprecise and often debated among organizational management and business ethics scholars. 
Generally, it refers to people and entities that are affected by a corporation’s behavior.  For this 
Comment, the term “stakeholder” includes financial and non-financial stakeholders.  Thus, 
“stakeholder” includes creditors, investors, and shareholders, and also employees, customers, 
suppliers, and communities. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (the first book to describe modern stakeholder theory); Andrew 
Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got What it Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & 
BUS. 249 (2010) (discussing the shareholder primacy versus stakeholder theory debate and its 
origins). 
 13.  Id. (requiring companies to score 80 out of 200 to qualify for B Corp certification). 
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industries.
14
  Notable B Corp certified companies include: Patagonia, 
Ben & Jerry’s, Seventh Generation, Method Products, Plum Organics, 
Etsy, Klean Kanteen, King Arthur Flour, UncommonGoods, Dansko, 
Cabot Creamery Cooperative, New Belgium Brewing Co., and Couch 
Surfing International.
15
  The Impact Assessment created by B Lab is free 
to anyone and businesses are encouraged to use the tool for self-
governance and benchmarking purposes.  To become certified, however, 
a business is required to pay a certification fee (based on revenue), work 
with a B Lab advisor, submit supporting documentation, be subject to 
periodic auditing, and publish an Impact Assessment report annually.
16
  
The company must also amend its governing documents.
17
 
B Lab requires most businesses to amend their governing documents 
to include language that expands traditional corporate responsibilities by 
requiring consideration of non-shareholder stakeholder interests, namely 
employees, consumers, the community, and the environment.
18
  The legal 
effect of amending a corporation’s governing documents is dependent on 
state law, and specifically whether the incorporating state has a 
constituency statute.
19
  Although courts may give some deference to 
inclusion of these rights and responsibilities in the corporation’s articles, 
they may not successfully overrule the shareholder profit maximization 
norm in certain situations. 
                                                          
 14.  BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
 15.  Find a B Corp, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/community/directory (last visited Oct.23, 2013). 
 16.  See How to Become a B Corp, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) 
(explaining the process and requirements to become a benefit corporation).  
 17.  Depending on how and where the company is legally organized, it may need to amend its 
governing documents. See generally Legal Roadmap, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1057-legal-roadmap (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2013).  For example, corporations organized in states without constituency statutes 
and LLCs must amend their articles of incorporation to include specific language before two years 
after receiving B Corp Certification.  Corporations organized in states that have adopted benefit 
corporation legislation may have to amend their governing documents or elect benefit corporation 
status. Corporate Legal Roadmap, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-
a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1061-corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).  
 18.  See supra note 17.   
 19.  See infra Section II.D for a discussion of constituency statutes; see also Stephen 
Bainbridge, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Principle Versus Non-Shareholder Constituency 
Statutes, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE BLOG (May 5, 2012), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-shareholder-wealth-
maximization-principle-versus-non-shareholder-constituency-statutes.html (discussing the 
constituency statutes and the legal uncertainty of how they apply). 
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B. Existing Business Forms 
Businesses with models that pursue a dual mission of making a profit 
and providing a social benefit—social enterprises—are constrained by 
the choice of business forms available.
20
 The nonprofit form is not 
always a viable choice because nonprofits are unable to distribute profits 
and be privately owned.
21
  Nonprofits face difficulties in raising capital 
(both debt and equity) and have additional operational burdens imposed 
on them to maintain tax-exempt status.
22
  Further, the trend among 
nonprofits has been increasingly to rely on the revenue generated in 
furtherance of their social purpose (“earned” revenue) and less on 
philanthropic and government support.
23
  Operating costs for nonprofits 
have been increasing, private donations and governmental support have 
decreased, the number of nonprofit organizations has increased 
substantially causing competition for funds, and demand for the services 
provided by nonprofits has increased.
24
  This has caused many nonprofits 
to walk a fine line to keep their tax-exempt status and others to seek a 
for-profit form that better suits their needs. 
B Lab founder, Jay Coen Gilbert summed up the problem while 
presenting at TedxPhilly in 2010 like this: 
Nonprofits, as wonderful as they are, and as many places as the market 
cannot reach, and as important as that is for nonprofits to be there—it’s 
really tough to do scalable change when you are walking around at the 
beginning of every year with a begging bowl hoping that people take 
whatever is left in their pocket at the end of the year and give it to you 
                                                          
 20.  There are conflicting opinions about what the definition of social enterprise is and what it 
should be.  See, e.g., Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 287–90 (2012)  (advocating for a definition of social enterprise 
that excludes socially responsible businesses without a specific social mission that drives the 
organization).  For the purposes of this paper, a “social enterprise” is an organization that has social 
benefit as its primary mission or that adopts a dual mission of profit and social benefit.  See MARK J.  
LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 7 (2011) (adopting a 
similar definition) (“[F]or purposes of this book, ‘social enterprise’ will refer to any business model 
that, to a significant degree, has a mission-driven motive . . . which may be exclusive of a profit 
motive or blended with one.”). 
 21.  Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act §§1.40(10), 13.01 (1987); 26 C.F.R. 
§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).  
 22.  See generally J.  Haskell Murray & Edward I.  Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 9–14 (2011) (discussing the barriers to capital raising that non-profits face). 
 23.  Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 337, 353 (2009). 
 24.  See LANE, supra note 20, at 8 (listing probable reasons for the trend as enumerated by the 
Social Enterprise Alliance). 
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to do your good works.  Alms for the poor is not going to be sufficient.  
So the hard reality is that we have no choice but to harness the power of 
business to solve social and environmental problems.
25
 
One of the most widely used forms of for-profit business is the 
corporation.  There are many reasons why businesses choose the 
corporate form over other for-profit forms, including liability concerns, 
tax considerations, profit disbursement, and availability of financing.
26
  
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are a popular choice for social 
entrepreneurs because of the inherent flexibility in structure and 
organization, but the LLC form has drawbacks as well.  Membership 
interests in LLCs are typically not as liquid as shares in a corporation; 
LLCs are unable to operate as publicly traded companies; and 
institutional investors and other sophisticated investors are less inclined 
to invest in an LLC.
27
 
C. Traditional Corporate Law 
The long legal and social history of profit maximization as the 
central purpose of a corporation is at odds with the dual missions of 
social entrepreneurs.  Social entrepreneurs fear that under traditional 
corporate law, they will be forced to make decisions that maximize profit 
for the corporation’s owners rather than pursue the social purpose of the 
company, or make decisions that harm society or undermine the 
company’s core values in pursuit of profit maximization.  There is much 
debate over the extent to which directors and officers of corporations 
may pursue social purposes without breaching their fiduciary duties to 
shareholders.
28
  There are three levels of judicial scrutiny afforded to 
                                                          
 25.  Jay Coen Gilbert, TedxPhilly: On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE (DEC. 1, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU (beginning at 7’08”). 
 26.  See Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 173 
(2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol7/iss1/6.  
 27.  See id. at 174. 
 28.  Cf. Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a 
For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP.  L.  REV.  271, 286 (2009) (“[S]ocially responsible companies who have created a culture 
and deliberate strategy of balancing a duty to all stakeholders are more likely to win the court’s 
presumption that they are not in violation of their fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profit.”); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48, 155 (2012) (“[C]orporate law requires directors, as a matter 
of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”); 
Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, 
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012, 8:31 AM), 
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When making day-to-day business decisions, directors are typically 
protected by the lenient business judgment rule.  The business judgment 
rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
30
  
The effect is a very high degree of judicial deference to director decision-
making when the business judgment rule applies. 
The business judgment rule is rebutted if, in a suit against a 
corporation’s directors, a plaintiff can show that the directors’ decision-
making process was grossly negligent, was not made in good faith, or 
was tainted by a conflict of interest.
31
  Lack of good faith consists, inter 
alia, of conscious disregard of a known duty to act.
32
  Thus, shareholders 
wishing to challenge directors’ day-to-day decisions—in which the 
directors considered the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders and 
failed to increase profits normally—are barred by the business judgment 
rule as long as directors can show some rational connection between the 
decision and shareholder benefit, either in the short-term or long-term.
33
  
But what of a director who explicitly decides to pursue social good over 
profit?  For a company that has made a commitment not to pursue profit 
at the expense of society or for a company with a primary goal of social 
benefit, director decisions that explicitly fail to take into account 
shareholder wealth maximization would likely not be afforded protection 
by the business judgment rule because the directors would have 
consciously disregarded a known duty and therefore would not have 
                                                          
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-
harmful-dichotomy/ (“[F]or the vast majority of corporate decisions, there is no legal restriction on 
directors’ ability to consider the interests of other stakeholders . . . .”). 
 29.  The strictest level of scrutiny is typically reserved for breach of duty of loyalty cases, 
which include situations in which the directors have a conflict of interest or in which they have acted 
other than in good faith. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 30.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 31.  Id. at 812–13.  
 32.  In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 33.  Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.  1986) (“A 
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there 
are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).  If the plaintiff fails to rebut the 
business judgment rule, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove waste, “an expenditure 
of corporate funds or a disposition of corporate assets for which no consideration is received in 
exchange and for which there is no rational business purpose.” 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 1.42 (1994). In the context of a social enterprise deciding to sacrifice profits by 
using corporate resources to further its social mission, it is possible that a court would find waste.  
 
556 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
acted in good faith.
34
 
When director attempts to defend against corporate takeover 
attempts are challenged, courts look at director decisions with enhanced 
scrutiny because takeover defenses necessarily have the effect of 
entrenching the directors in office.
35
  Under standards established in 
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Company, directors are given 
protection of the business judgment rule only if they can initially show as 
a threshold matter that they were responding in good faith to a legitimate 
threat to the corporation and the responsive actions taken were 
“reasonable” in light of the threat.
36
  Applying Unocal standards in eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
refused to uphold the shareholder rights plan adopted by the original 
founders—Craig Newmark and Jim Buckmaster—of Craigslist in an 
attempt to keep eBay from buying a controlling block of the stock.
37
  The 
relevant commentary from the eBay case is that the court rejected the 
proposition that the premise of the rights plan—which specifically stated 
the public-service mission of the company—was a legitimate corporate 
policy that would be protected by the business judgment rule.
38
  The 
court further stated: 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. 
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation 
for the benefit of its stockholders.  The “Inc.” after the company name 
has to mean at least that.  Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the 
purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that 
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the 
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of 
its stockholders. . . .
39
 
Based on the analysis of the Delaware Chancery Court, protecting a 
                                                          
 34.  See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and 
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM.  U.  BUS.  L.  REV. 1, 12 (2012) (arguing that cases enforcing 
shareholder profit maximization are rare because directors, officers, and their lawyers “seem to have 
realized they need to tie altruistic motivations back to long-term shareholder value”); see also Strine, 
supra note 28, at 155 (“Fundamental to the [business judgment] rule, however, is that the fiduciary 
be motivated by a desire to increase the value of the corporation for the benefit of the 
stockholders.”). 
 35.  Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.  1985). 
 36.  493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del.  1985).  
 37.  16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 38.  Id. at 34. 
 39.  Id. 
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social mission is not a legitimate corporate interest worthy of judicial 
deference in the context of defending against a takeover attempt. 
When a company is sold, courts impose an enhanced Unocal level of 
scrutiny on directors.
40
  The court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings established a director duty to maximize shareholder 
value, without regard to other constituencies, when the sale of the 
company is inevitable.
41
  A director in this context no longer has the 
ability to consider non-shareholder stakeholders and defend the decision 
by pointing to some potential long-term benefit to shareholders.  
Directors have a duty to sell to the highest bidder.  In a Revlon scenario, 
a social enterprise would therefore be forced to take the highest offer 
regardless of the likelihood of the acquiring company carrying on the 
mission of the social enterprise. 
Although some states have enacted constituency statutes that allow 
directors to consider non-shareholder interests when making decisions in 
takeover contexts, these statutes are rarely invoked and have little case 
law to support their interpretation.
42
  Ultimately, directors of for-profit 
corporations are required to consider shareholder wealth maximization 
above all else in the context of change-of-control situations—when the 
company is “for sale” and also when reacting to a perceived threat of 
takeover.  Moreover, in daily decision-making, the protection of the 
business judgment rule may be revoked if a director “confesses” to 
making a decision to promote social good rather than increase profit.
43
  
For social enterprises, this is a sufficiently likely scenario that the threat 
of being sued for pursuing a social mission can stifle the social 
entrepreneur attempting to use a for-profit model to benefit society. 
D.  Constituency Statutes 
In response to the Revlon ruling in 1986, many states passed 
constituency statutes that allow directors to consider other stakeholders 
when making decisions.  Many commentators point to these constituency 
                                                          
 40.  Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994). 
 41.  506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  
 42.  LANE, supra note 20, at 137–40; See infra Part II.D. for a more thorough discussion of 
constituency statutes. 
 43.  See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (finding statements 
concerning the directors’ motivations were important in determining whether the directors could be 
sued); Strine, supra note 28, at 147–48 (“By confessing that he was placing his altruistic interest in 
helping workers and consumers over his duty to stockholders, Henry Ford made it impossible for the 
court to afford him business judgment deference.”). 
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statutes to support the claim that existing law protects social enterprise 
directors from the standards established by Revlon.
44
 
Currently, thirty-two states have some version of a constituency 
statute that permits corporate directors to consider the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders.
45
  Notably, neither Delaware nor Kansas has a 
constituency statute.  Chancellor Leo E. Strine of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery addressed the profit-maximizing pressures on boards in a 
recent law review essay: 
Precisely because it is ultimately the equity market that is the primary 
accountability system for public firms, efforts to tinker around with the 
margins of corporate law through initiatives like constituency statutes, 
the so-called Corporate Social Responsibility movement, and 
antitakeover provisions have been of very little utility in insulating 
corporate boards from stockholder and stock market pressures.
46
 
Constituency statutes vary considerably from state to state.  A few 
apply only to publicly traded corporations;
47
 nearly one third only apply 
in takeover or change of control situations;
48
 and some mandate 
                                                          
 44.  E.g., Mickels, supra note 28, at 290; Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge 
v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 169 (2008). 
 45.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2008); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
414-221(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1602, 1702 (2008); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 
(2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (1999); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831(6) (2009); MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (2007); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS Ch. 15D §8.30 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
79-4-8.30(d) (2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §78.138 (1999); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:6-1(2), :6-14(4) (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2004); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW § 717(b) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1701.59(E) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2009); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (1995); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.2-8(a) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2007); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 48-103-202, 204 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. 
§13.1-727.1 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2009).  
For a more complete discussion of constituency statutes, see John Tyler, Negating the Legal 
Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 
VT. L. REV. 117, 131–38 (2010). See also Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: 
Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999). 
 46.  Strine, supra note 28, at 153.  
 47.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) 
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1602, 1702 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2007). 
 48.  Constituency statutes that apply only in the context of a takeover include: IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 490.1108 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(g) (1994); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-104(9) (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (Supp. 
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1988); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995).  Constituency 
statutes that apply in the broader change of control context include: CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-756 
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consideration of shareholder interests while also allowing consideration 
of other stakeholder interests.
49
  Some statutes explicitly list allowable 
stakeholders, some apply to directors but not officers, and a few have 
opt-in provisions.
50
  Essentially, constituency statutes allow directors to 
consider some stakeholders in certain contexts.  Constituency statutes do 
not require directors and officers to consider stakeholders when making 
decisions and do not prioritize non-shareholder stakeholders over 
shareholders.  In his essay exploring the new L3C hybrid social 
enterprise entity, John Tyler sums up the effect of constituency statutes 
on social enterprises: 
[T]here are strong legal and practical arguments that decisions to 
benefit non-shareholder interests or minimize effects on non-
shareholders must still be justified relative to shareholder value . . . . 
[B]ecause maximizing shareholder value appears to be the dominant 
applicable theory for purposes of the for-profit corporation . . . 
constituency statutes may not generally protect directors motivated by a 
desire to maximize benefits to non-shareholder interests when doing so 
has no legitimate benefit to shareholders.
51
 
The resultant insecurity has caused many mission-driven 
corporations to structure their enterprises creatively in an attempt to 
protect their corporate mission with shareholder agreements, stock class 
restrictions, non-profit arms, and amendments to the corporation’s 
articles, all with limited success.
52
  B Lab encourages companies seeking 
B Corp Certification to incorporate in a state with a constituency statute; 
                                                          
(2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1602, 1702 (2008); and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-33-4(1) (2007).  
Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary 
Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 409, 463 (2002) (noting that constituency statutes were enacted in response to Revlon and 
almost one-third apply only in the context of a takeover). 
 49.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2004); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2009). 
 50.  GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-103-204 (1995); PA. 
CONS. STAT. §1715 (1995). 
 51.  Tyler, supra note 45, at 135, 137. 
 52.  See, e.g., Ryan J. Gaffney, Hype and Hostility for Hybrid Companies: a Fourth Sector 
Case Study, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 329, 334–37 (discussing the traditional approaches 
of using multiple entities and not-for-loss affiliates); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s 
Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 47 (2011) (discussing various restrictions to the for-profit 
form for companies wanting to pursue charitable missions, including Google Inc.’s two-tier stock 
structure that protects the founders’ mission.); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben 
and Jerry’s, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 39, 41 (2011) (discussing Ben and Jerry’s dual tiered 
stock structure and noting that Google and New York Times Co. have similar structures to give 
supermajority voting to its founders).  
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however, the extent of the protection to dual mission corporate directors 
is unclear.
53
  Some social enterprises have gravitated toward the limited 
liability company, which allows increased flexibility in its organizational 
documents.  LLCs, however, are also often less attractive to investors, 
particularly institutional investors, because of the lack of ownership 
transferability and inability to go public.  Other businesses have avoided 




In response to this struggle to fit within the confines of the traditional 
corporate structure and existing corporate law, B Lab enlisted a corporate 
attorney to draft model legislation and began a nationwide campaign to 
create a new legal business form, the benefit corporation. 
E. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation 
Unlike LLCs, which originated in the early 1990s, benefit 
corporations are not a completely new type of business entity.  Under the 
model legislation, benefit corporations are traditional corporations, 
incorporated under a state’s general corporate law, that have elected to be 
subject to special provisions that impose stricter accountability and 
transparency requirements and explicitly alter some traditional corporate 
norms.
55
  States that have adopted benefit corporation legislation add the 
legislation to the existing corporate code and companies elect benefit 
corporation status, much like statutory close corporation provisions.
56
 
The main characteristics of benefit corporations are: (1) a 
requirement that the corporation have a purpose to create a material 
positive impact on society and the environment; (2) a requirement that 
directors consider non-shareholder interests as well as shareholder 
interests when making decisions; and (3) a requirement to publish an 
annual report of its social and environmental performance measured by 
an independent, third-party standard.
57
  Electing to become a benefit 




                                                          
 53.  Tyler, supra note 45, at 137. 
 54.  Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 337, 365 (2009) (discussing the “multiple-entity” approach and its disadvantages). 
 55.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101(c) (B Lab 2013). 
 56.  See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341–356 (2013). 
 57.  BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 15. 
 58.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 104 (B Lab 2013). 
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A benefit corporation must adopt a general purpose to create a 
“material, positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”
59
  Benefit corporations are allowed 
to have a specific public benefit as well, and the model legislation lists 
many possibilities, including: providing low-income or underserved 
individuals or communities with beneficial products or services, 
promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond 
the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of business, preserving the 
environment, and improving human health.
60
  The legislation was written 
so that financial interests of the corporation do not necessarily take 
precedence over the public benefit purposes. 
Directors of a benefit corporation are required to consider the effects 
of any action or inaction on shareholders, employees, customers, the 
community, and the environment.
61
  Additionally, the legislation 
explicitly requires directors to consider both the long-term and short-
term interests of the corporation and to consider how decisions will 
affect the corporation’s ability to accomplish its general public benefit 
purpose.
62
  In theory, shareholders could bring an action against directors 
and officers for failure to create a positive social and environmental 
impact, but they could not bring a claim for failure to maximize profit.
63
  
The legislation does limit director liability for monetary damages, 




Further, a benefit corporation is required to create and publish an 
annual benefit report that includes a description of the ways the 
corporation created a material positive impact and any ways it failed to 
accomplish creating a positive impact.
65
  It is also required to explain 
why it chose, and how it applied, the third-party standard that it used.
66
  
Benefit corporations are not required to use the third-party standard 
created by B Lab, nor become B Corp certified, but they must use a 
third-party organization that provides comprehensive, credible, 
                                                          
 59.  §§ 201(a), 102 (2013).   
 60.  §§ 201(b), 102(a) (2013). 
 61.  § 301(a)(1) (2013).  
 62.  § 301(a)(1)(vi) (2013). 
 63.  § 305 (2013). 
 64.  § 301(c) (2013). 
 65.  § 401 (2013). 
 66.  § 401(a) (2013). 
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independent, and transparent standards.
67
  Of course, B Lab’s B Corp 
Certification is a possible third-party standard, but there are many other 
third-party standards available as well.  B Lab published a list of 
recommended third-party standards including: The Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), GreenSeal, Underwriters Laboratories (UL), ISO2600, 
and Green America.
68
  Some organizations may provide a better fit for a 
particular industry, business size, or regional area.  Although the model 
legislation allows organizations to choose any third party standard, to 
eliminate the potential for fraud and to allow for ease of data collection, 
Kansas should consider limiting the choices to a few well-known and 
respected standards. 
Maryland was the first state to pass benefit corporation legislation in 
April 2010.
69
  Since then eighteen additional states and the District of 
Columbia have passed the legislation.
70
  Three more states have 
introduced the legislation
71
 and Washington has passed “Special Purpose 
Corporation” legislation that requires corporations to adhere to a third-
party corporate social responsibility standard if the requirement is 
included in the articles of incorporation.
72
 
F. Other Hybrid Entities 
In addition to the benefit corporation, there have been other new 
“hybrid” legal entities adopted by various states.  The limited liability 
low profit company (L3C) is the most successful, having been adopted 
by nine states to date.
73
  The L3C was created to attract program-related 
investments (PRIs) from foundations.
74
  The idea is that, although 
                                                          
 67.  § 102(a) (2013) (“Third-party standard.”). 
 68.   Selecting a Third Party Standard, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://benefitcorp.net/selecting-a-third-party-standard/list-of-standards (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 69.  MD. CODE ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2012). 
 70.  States that have enacted benefit corporation legislation include: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia. Passing Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 71.  Passing Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/legislation (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).  
 72.  WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.040(2)(b) (2012), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=23B.25&full=true. 
 73. Laws, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/legislation.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
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foundations have the latitude to invest in businesses that have a charter 
substantially similar to the mission of the foundation, due diligence to 
research PRIs is costly and time consuming.  As a result, most 
foundations overlook the potential investment opportunity in for-profit 
companies that have missions that would qualify for the funding.  The 
L3C seeks to rectify this by putting explicit language, sanctioned by the 
IRS for PRIs, in its organizational documents to make it easier for 
foundations to recognize the L3C as a potential investment.
75
  




On the same day that benefit corporation legislation passed in 
California, the legislators also passed the Corporate Flexibility Act, 
making the flexible purpose corporation another incorporation option for 
social entrepreneurs.
77
  Flexible purpose corporations must include in 
their articles of incorporation a statement of specific purpose.
78
 The 
purpose can either be one of the activities that charitable organizations 
are authorized by the IRS to have for tax-exempt status, or it can be a 
purpose of providing a long-term or short-term benefit to the 
corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, the community 
and society, or the environment.
79
  Flexible purpose corporations are not 
required to be assessed by a third-party standard or to pursue a general 
public benefit the way that benefit corporations must.
80
  They are 
permissive and allow directors to consider the specific purpose when 
making decisions, much like constituency statutes, but do not require 
directors to consider other non-shareholder stakeholders when making 
                                                          
Program-related investments are investments made by foundations to support charitable 
activities that involve the potential return of capital within an established time frame.  
Tax-exempt section 501(c)(3) private foundations are required to distribute 5% of their 
income each year for charitable purposes, either in the form of grants or investments.  If 
they choose to invest the money, any investment must qualify as a PRI, which as defined 
by sections 4944(c) and 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code are those investments 
with primarily religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. 
Id. 
 75.  The Concept of the L3C, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 76.  Cf. BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, app. C 3 (noting that the IRS has 
not approved program-related investments in L3Cs and this may pose a risk to foundations who 
invest in L3Cs “as somehow ‘pre-approved’ by the IRS”). 
 77.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (2012). 
 78.  §§ 2602(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
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decisions the way benefit corporation statutes do.
81
  The statute protects 
flexible purpose corporations from lawsuits for failure to maximize 
shareholder profit in change-of-control situations without the added 
requirement of transparency or mandate to produce a social benefit.
82
 
Maryland, the first state to pass benefit corporation legislation, later 
passed a benefit LLC statute modeled on the benefit corporation 
legislation.
83
  The addition of the benefit requirements to the LLC statute 
was likely unnecessary as the LLC form is highly flexible and can 
accommodate social enterprises with ease.  Unlike the L3C, which was 
created with a specific purpose of increasing investments from 
foundations, the benefit LLC in Maryland merely provides the added 
benefit of branding.  Washington has also passed legislation allowing 
incorporation of social purpose corporations.
84
  The legislation is very 
similar to benefit corporation legislation except that directors are not 
mandated to consider other stakeholders.  Instead, directors may consider 




The rise in the number of social enterprise statutes enacted in recent 
years is promising as a sign that the public and legislators recognize the 
need for additional entity forms.  There is a possibility, however, that the 
vast number of statutes will create unnecessary competition—for 
example, between the flexible purpose corporation and the benefit 
corporation in California—frustrating the effort and ultimately causing 
more difficulty for consumers. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Commentators on the new benefit corporation legislation have thus 
far been critical, not only of distinct provisions of the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, but of the legislation generally.
86
  Although 
                                                          
 81.  Id.  
 82.  § 2700(c). 
 83.  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1101–1108 (2013). 
 84.  WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.005–.150. (2012). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0-A Breakthrough in 
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1067 (2011) (criticizing the Maryland statute 
for failing “to cure the issue of stakeholder neglect in corporate decision-making”); Briana 
Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce A Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 578 (2012) (arguing that the requirements of certification from an independent third 
party and annual reports to the public “are ill-suited to the regulation of social welfare objectives”). 
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some argue that benefit corporations are unnecessary and that current 
corporate law is adequate to accommodate mission-driven businesses,
87
  
those who support the idea of social enterprise legislation have concerns 
that the vagueness of the public-benefit requirement and the third-party 
standard opens the door to “greenwashing” or fraud.
88
  Others argue that 
choosing to incorporate as a benefit corporation limits a company’s 
ability to attract capital because investors are less likely to invest in 
companies without profit as the primary goal.
89
 
A. Enhanced Legal Protection 
1. Successor Concerns and Change-of-Control Scenarios 
Whether directors of mission-driven businesses breach their 
fiduciary duties by considering non-shareholders when making decisions 
depends considerably on the context of the decision, and is anything but 
clear.
90
  There is evidence to suggest that even decisions usually afforded 
protection by the business judgment rule may not be afforded such 
protection when a director explicitly states that a decision was made 
without regard for shareholder wealth maximization.
91
  In a recent essay, 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
commented on the famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
92
 in which 
Henry Ford explicitly declined to increase the dividend to shareholders in 
order to reinvest in the company and thus improve the lives of his 
workers.
93
  Chancellor Strine stated that “[b]y confessing that he was 
placing his altruistic interest in helping workers and consumers over his 
duty to stockholders, Henry Ford made it impossible for the court to 
afford him business judgment deference.”
94
 
                                                          
 87.  Underberg, supra note 28. 
 88.  Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization? 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 611 (2011).   
 89.  Ashley Schoenjahn, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will New Entity Forms Allow 
Businesses to Do Good?, 37 J. CORP. L. 453, 471–72 (2012).  
 90.  See Part II.C., supra. 
 91.  See Murray, supra note 34, at 12 (arguing that cases enforcing shareholder profit 
maximization are rare because directors, officers, and their lawyers “seem to have realized they need 
to tie altruistic motivations back to long-term shareholder value”). 
 92.  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 93.  Id. at 671. (“My ambition,’ declared Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men; to spread the 
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives 
and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business.”). 
 94.  Strine, supra note 28, at 147–48.  
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Benefit corporation statutes clearly define the dual-mission purpose 
of socially motivated businesses and go one step further by requiring 
directors and officers to consider other stakeholders when making 
decisions.  The legislation circumvents the debate over whether a 
corporation should consider other stakeholders to act ethically and 
bypasses the muddy waters surrounding fiduciary duties in traditional 
corporations by clearly articulating that the fiduciary duties for directors 
of benefit corporations extend to non-shareholder stakeholders.  Whether 
the mandate is enforceable and specific enough to guide directors in 
decision-making is debated; and as time goes on, additional tweaking of 
the statutes may be necessary to ensure compliance and ultimately 
balance the rights afforded to shareholders and directors. 
Critics argue that benefit corporation legislation allows directors to 
make excuses for poor decisions.  While the benefit corporation 
legislation does give corporate directors enhanced protection from 
shareholder lawsuits for failure to maximize profit, directors in 
traditional corporations are already largely protected by the business 
judgment rule, absent a showing of waste, for day-to-day decisions.
95
  A 
clear and distinct statute is needed because there is uncertainty as to 
whether the business judgment rule applies to social enterprises and 
directors are unable to act in the best interest of all stakeholders in 
change-of-control situations in many states.  Further, the legislation 
potentially gives shareholders additional power to bring an action for a 
benefit corporation’s failure to pursue the general public benefit to which 
it is committed.  Although relief is limited to nonmonetary remedies, 
shareholders could potentially seek injunctive relief and alter the course 
of conduct of the corporation.
96
  In addition, shareholders always have 
the ability to vote out a director or to sell their shares in the company if 
they are unsatisfied with the direction the company is taking.  Finally, 
existing corporate law provides protection for self-dealing, 
misrepresentation, and fraud.
97
  Benefit corporation legislation does not 
alter that external framework. 
The important benefit that the legislation provides to social 
                                                          
 95.  See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.  
 96.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (benefit enforcement proceeding) and § 301(c) 
(exoneration from personal liability generally) (B Lab 2013). 
 97.  See, e.g., Schoenjahn, supra note 89, at 456 (“The business judgment rule does not blindly 
protect every decision that boards make . . . [it] does not protect directors who breach their fiduciary 
duties or make decisions without critically assessing the information necessary to reach an informed 
decision.”). 
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enterprises is that it rebuts the Unocal and Revlon standards, which are 
the certain legal impediments to any for-profit corporation in a non-
constituency statute state that does not adhere to profit maximization as 
its primary consideration.  Additionally, the legislation clarifies the gray 
area surrounding director fiduciary duties in decision-making roles on a 
day-to-day basis.  Some academics have minimized the need for this 
enhanced legal protection,
98
 but successor concerns and fear of the 
company’s mission becoming diluted at succession or after acquisition 
are common and well-founded.
99
  As the table below illustrates, many 
socially conscious companies have fewer social initiatives after 
acquisition. 
 
  Table 1: Takeover of ethical companies by multinationals (examples)
100
 





Body Shop Cosmetics L’Oréal 11 3.5 
Green & Blacks Chocolate Cadbury Schweppes 16 8.5 
Ben and Jerry’s Ice cream Unilever n/a 3.5 
Tom’s Maine Toothpaste Colgate Palmolive 16 10.5 
* Ethiscore is a rating that takes into consideration nearly 300 topics under five main 
categories: animals, environment, people, politics, and sustainability.101 
 
In fact, socially conscious businesses may be more likely to be the 
targets of takeovers—friendly or hostile.
102
  Some larger corporations 
                                                          
 98.  See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice 
Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
FIRMS 13, 14 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that managers of ordinary corporations have 
some legal discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC 32 (2012) (“As far as the law is concerned, maximizing shareholder value is not a 
requirement; it is just one possible corporate objective out of many.”).  
 99.  Dobrinka Veljković & Daliborka Petrović, The Role of Corporate Image in the Process of 
Company Takeovers, 8(1) MEGATREND REV.: THE INT’L REV. APPLIED ECON. 77, 88–89 (2011).  
 100.  Adapted from id. at 88.  
 101.  Ethical Ratings, ETHICAL CONSUMER, 
http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/shoppingethically/ourethicalratings.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 
2013). 
 102. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. 
L. 221, 233–34 (2012). According to Plerhoples,  
A social enterprise with steady or high growth (or the potential for such) might face a sale 
or change in control transaction, either because the company’s stock price reflects its 
pursuit of a social or environmental mission or because profit-maximizing businesses 
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view companies with an ethical corporate image as an easy entry into the 
market,
103
 while others might target socially responsible businesses 
precisely because they do not maximize shareholder profits.
104
  
Companies that are not running at maximum efficiency can be bought 
and “trimmed” to be much more profitable. 
One goal—and one of the most important potential benefits—of 
incorporating as a benefit corporation is ensuring that the mission of the 
corporation will survive when the company is sold or the founder’s 
successor takes over.  By incorporating as a benefit corporation, 
Patagonia’s founder, Yvon Chouinard, hoped to ensure that the mission 
of the corporation would survive.
105
 According to Chouinard, 
Patagonia is trying to build a company that could last 100 years. . . . 
Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable 
mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven 
through succession, capital raises, and even changes in ownership, by 
institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and high standards put 
in place by founding entrepreneurs.
106
 
Most benefit corporation statutes require at least a two-thirds vote of 
all shareholders for the corporation to transition from a benefit 
corporation to a traditional corporation.
107
  However, only California, 
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Colorado benefit corporation statutes 
explicitly provide for dissenters’ rights, which may increase the 
likelihood of shareholder lawsuits from investors who are unhappy with 
a transition to or from benefit corporation status.
108
  Allowing for 
                                                          
want a piece of the market share for conscientious consumers. That is, a social enterprise 
may face a change in control transaction precisely because company earnings are not its 
only bottom line.   
Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. See also Murray, supra note 34, at 39 (acknowledging that “successful social 
enterprises . . . may be prime hostile takeover targets”). 
 105.  Bart King, Patagonia is First to Register for Benefit Corporation Status in California, 
SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/articles/patagonia-first-register-
%E2%80%98benefit-corporation%E2%80%99-status-california. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 104 (B Lab 2013).  An amendment to the articles 
or a fundamental transaction that will terminate benefit corporation status also requires a minimum 
two-thirds vote.  § 105 (2013). 
 108.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §5 (2012) (allowing 
for appraisal rights only in the context of a traditional corporation electing benefit corporation 
status); S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013); H.B. 13-1138, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 
(Colo. 2013). 
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dissenters’ rights adds an additional layer of protection for corporations 
seeking benefit corporation status by ensuring that investors’ and 
directors’ interests remain aligned and preventing potential litigation. 
B. Branding and Differentiation 
Although individual statutes vary by state, the public benefit 
requirement in the model legislation is purposely broad to avoid allowing 
companies to choose one narrow, specific public-benefit purpose and 
claim benefit corporation status.
109
  This reduces the likelihood that a 
corporation will falsely market itself as “green” or socially beneficial 
when it is actually doing very little good overall.  The model legislation 
also contains detailed descriptions of independent third-party standards, 
and B Lab has published guidelines for businesses choosing a third-party 
standard.
110
  Despite this, much of the criticism of benefit corporations is 
due to the ambiguity of the third-party standard requirement.
111
  
Professor Dana Brakman Reiser, in a 2011 law review article, articulated 
this concern: 
The requirement of general public benefit is vague and undefined.  The 
determination of whether a particular organization’s goals pursue a 
general public benefit is left to an unregulated third-party standards 
setter. . . . If a standard-setter clearly and transparently sets low 
standards, it may qualify unrelated entities to form as benefit 
corporations just as would a standard-setter with higher standards, 
leaving the door open to greenwashing or even fraud.
112
 
Socially conscious watchdog organizations have struggled for years 
to clearly articulate a set of metrics that effectively measures non-
financial performance of companies.
113
  Part of the complication in 
determining effective metrics is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
approach.  Arguably, companies in less common industries would be 
marginalized if the statute was written with strict guidelines on the third-
                                                          
 109.  BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 21. 
 110.  Criteria for Acceptable Third Party Standards, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://benefitcorp.net/selecting-a-third-party-standard/criteria-for-acceptable-third-party-standards 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
 111.  Reiser, supra note 88. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Symposium, Panel Discussion: Reform: Are There Too Many Cooks in the Corporate 
Kitchen?, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 67, 80 (1997) (noting that social benefit organizations 
“have been struggling for the last couple of years . . . to define some non-financial measure of 
performance that might influence investors”). 
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party standard that should be applied.  Luckily, after years of working to 
measure non-financial performance and an increased demand for 
sustainability reporting from private companies, many reputable 




The model legislation allows the company to determine the proper 
third-party standard and requires the company to disclose its reasons for 
choosing the standard.  The provision from the model legislation 
prescribes requirements for a comprehensive standard that is “developed 
by an organization that is independent of the benefit corporation,” is 
credible, and is transparent.
115
 
Although most companies that are willing to undergo enhanced 
scrutiny, greater transparency, and increased potential liability are likely 
quite committed to operating a mission-driven business, the lack of 
regulation and consensus on third-party standards is a legitimate 
concern.
116
  It may be that states will be forced to amend their statutes in 
the future to restrict further the third-party standard requirement, or it 
may be that courts will ultimately offer further clarification as to the way 
the third-party standard should be applied and which standards qualify 
for benefit corporations.  For example, a court may eventually need to 
rule on a case interpreting when a third party has the requisite experience 
and knowledge to develop an allowable third-party standard.
117
 
One important aspect of the benefit corporation reporting 
requirement is that it not only requires the company to report its 
successes in pursuing the general—and specific, if any—purpose, but 
also to report its shortcomings.
118
  It requires the company to report its 
rationale for selecting or changing the third-party standard used to 
prepare the report.
119
  Kansas, and other states, should consider adopting 
                                                          
 114.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 115.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102(a) (B Lab 2013). 
 116.  See Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis 
with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1039 (2013) (“It is 
essential to note that the statutes explicitly state that the assessment [of a corporation’s benefit 
purpose and performance] ‘does not need to be audited or certified by a third party’”). 
 117. E.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab 2013) (defining “third-party 
standard” as a standard that is comprehensive, developed by an independent organization, credible, 
and transparent).  The third-party credibility requirement is satisfied only when a person is shown to 
have “access to necessary expertise to assess overall corporate social and environmental 
performance.”  Id.  Without more specific criteria, this requirement is ambiguous and could lead to 
abuse.  
 118.  §401(a)(1)(iii). 
 119.  BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 18. 
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existing credible reporting standards, like the B Corp Certification or 
Global Reporting Initiative standards, as model third-party standards 
with room for additional organizations to apply for inclusion in the 
statute.  It will be up to the states or the shareholders to demand a highly 
credible reporting standard, the legitimacy of which may have important 
consequences for the long-term success of the benefit corporation. 
Traditional corporations increasingly generate “sustainability 
reports” with varying levels of transparency and reporting criteria.
120
  It 
is difficult for many small social enterprises to compete with large 
marketing budgets and resources.  If the benefit corporation is successful 
in gaining notoriety and respect for good business practices, the higher 
transaction costs of mandatory reporting and analysis incurred annually 
by benefit corporations may be offset by the savings in marketing and 
branding required to convince consumers of the sustainability and 
socially beneficial policies of the organization.  Labels like “organic” 
and “fair trade” have established this type of legitimacy and consumer 
trust; however, without additional regulation and oversight, the benefit 
corporation may find this level of acceptance unattainable.  B Corp 
certified companies, for example, are randomly audited and information 
is verified when the company initially seeks certification.  Allowing 
courts to order a similar audit of benefit corporations, as a remedy in a 
benefit enforcement proceeding, would likely achieve a higher level of 
legitimacy for the benefit corporation “brand.” 
C. Access to Capital and Financial Incentives 
Benefit corporations have been criticized for their inability to attract 
capital because investors are more likely to be interested in corporations 
with profit as the primary motive.
121
  However, the rapid growth of 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) and Impact Investing tends to 
prove that investors are looking at factors other than simply the highest 
return when choosing where to invest their money.
122
  The SRI 
                                                          
 120.  See GRI Year In Review 2011–12, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Annual-Report-2011-2012.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2013) (citing the KPMG 2011 International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting) 
(“95 percent of the 250 biggest companies in the world report their sustainability performance.”). 
 121.  Schoenjahn, supra note 89, at 471–72. 
 122.  Perspectives on Progress: The Impact Investor Survey, JP MORGAN AND GLOBAL IMPACT 
INVESTING NETWORK, at 21 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/download?row=489&field=gated_download_1 (surveying a set of 99 impact investors, 
each managing more than $10 million in assets, who expect investing to grow from eight billion in 
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movement currently represents almost ten percent of U.S. assets under 
management, roughly $2.3 trillion.
123
  Traditionally, socially responsible 
investors boycotted companies that engaged in “bad” behavior—tobacco, 
alcohol, weapons, etc.  More recently, investors have begun to seek out 
“good” companies and invest in enterprises that will have the most social 
impact, called Impact Investing.
124
  A 2009 report published by the 
Monitor Institute, a philanthropy and nonprofit management consulting 
firm originally founded by Harvard economist Michael Porter, estimates 
that Impact Investing has the potential to grow to about one percent of 




B Lab has developed a Global Impact Investing Ratings System 
(GIIRS) that provides rating and analytics for social and environmental 
impact of companies and funds similar to financial ratings and 
analytics.
126
  Launched in September 2011, it now boasts over $4 billion 
impact assets under management, provides ratings for 246 companies 
and 32 funds, and has an additional 103 companies and 28 funds in the 
works.
127
  How much Impact Investing and SRI will grow in years to 
come is anyone’s guess, but the trend of investing with more in mind 
than financial return is undoubtedly growing and may give social 
enterprises access to additional revenue streams. 
Although IRS regulations for tax-exempt nonprofits are rigid, benefit 
corporations, like L3Cs, can qualify for program-related investments, 
and it is possible that eventually legislators at the federal level may be 
persuaded to give tax advantages to benefit corporations.  Philadelphia 
recently gave tax preference to certified sustainable businesses—B Corp 
certified businesses included—in the form of a tax credit of $4,000.
128
  
                                                          
2012 to nine billion in 2013).  
 123.  2010 Report of Socially Responsible Investment Trends in the United States, UNITED 
STATES SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM (USSIF), at 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/10_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf.  
 124.  GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/resources/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) GIIRS defines impact investing as 
“investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate 
measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.”  Id. 
 125.  Jessica Freireich & Katherine Fulton, Investing for Social and Environmental Impact 
Executive Summary, MONITOR INSTITUTE, at 3 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.monitorinstitute.com/impactinvesting/documents/InvestingforSocialandEnvImpact_Exec
Sum_000.pdf.  
 126.  GIIRS, http://giirs.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Philadelphia First City to Offer Green Biz Tax Incentives, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM 
(Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/19350.  
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At least three universities have created financial incentives for social 
enterprises to hire recent graduates.  New York University’s Stern 
School of Business provides loan assistance for graduates who pursue 
careers in social enterprise, Yale School of Management has 
implemented a loan forgiveness program for graduates who go on to 
work for B Corp certified companies, and University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School and the University of North Carolina’s Kenan-Flagler 




Benefit corporation legislation offers greater protections for mission-
driven social enterprises to go public, more confidence in taking on new 
investors, and more legal certainty, thus eliminating a large financing 
barrier.  Benefit corporations that are financed with private equity or 
venture capital are more likely to attract patient investors who are 
aligned with companies’ missions and goals.  As benefit corporations 
become more widespread and well-known, additional financial 
opportunities and incentives will likely materialize. 
D. Kansas 
1. Kansas Economic Climate 
Nationally and statewide, the administrative focus has been on the 
best way to create jobs.  Governor Sam Brownback’s administration has 
made growing the Kansas economy and creating more jobs the central 
focus of legislative efforts.
130
  The Kansas Chamber of Commerce 
includes “free enterprise” and “removing obstacles that impede job 
creation” as core principles.
131
  New tax legislation and current economic 
conditions are estimated to produce a $327 million budget shortfall in the 
fiscal year beginning in July 2013, which will limit the amount of 
funding available to state funded social programs.
132
  Adopting benefit 
corporation legislation in Kansas, while not a substitute, would 
                                                          
 129.  Murray, supra note 34, at 50. 
 130.  Kansas Office of the Governor, Growing the Kansas Economy, 
https://governor.ks.gov/road-map/growing-kansas-economy (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 131.  The Kansas Chamber, 2012 LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, at 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.kansaschamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2012-
2012_Leg_Agenda1.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).  
 132.  Tim Carpenter, Kansas facing long-term $327M budget hole, TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2012-11-06/kansas-facing-long-term-327m-
budget-hole. 
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encourage social entrepreneurs to create startups in the state and may 
help bridge the gap by addressing social need in certain sectors.  Kansas 
has ample opportunities for socially focused businesses—from 
agriculture, technology, and energy production, to manufacturing—and 
has a wide variety of industries that align with many existing social 
ventures.  Any business can be a for-benefit business when it adopts best 
practices in core areas like employment, the environment, and 
community impact. 
Farming and agriculture provide ample opportunities for social 
ventures—for example, organic farming is one of the fastest growing 
agricultural segments in the country.
133
  The Kansas Department of 
Agriculture lists over eighty certified organic producers in the State.
134
  
The current administration is also focusing on the problem of declining 
populations in rural Kansas.  Small farming operations, local distributors, 
or retailers may be a potential source of new jobs and population growth 
if given the proper incentives.  The high-speed Google Fiber initiative 
has already prompted entrepreneurs and city officials in Kansas City to 
explore possible businesses that may develop around the new 
technology.
135
  Although benefit corporation legislation has been 
introduced in a number of Midwestern states, it has yet to be introduced 
in Missouri, which would give Kansas the added advantage of being the 
state of choice for social entrepreneurs looking to incorporate a business 
in the Kansas City metropolitan area. 
A few companies in the area have recently become B Corp certified.  
Ogden Publications, in Topeka, Kansas, became a B Corp certified 
company in May of 2010.
136
  The company boasts a variety of well-
known and niche publications including: Mother Earth News, Natural 
Home, Utne Reader, Grit, Gas Engine, and Motorcycle Classics.
137
  In 
Kansas City, Big Vision Media Group, a branding and marketing 
                                                          
 133.  Organic Agriculture, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture.aspx (last updated 
May 26, 2012). 
 134.  Certified Organic Producers in Kansas, KANSAS DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, 
http://www.ksda.gov/kansas_agriculture/content/153/cid/1157 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 135.   See Cyrus Farivar, Startups, would you couch-surf Kansas City just to get Google Fiber?, 
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/08/startups-would-
you-couchsurf-kansas-city-just-to-get-google-fiber/ (describing an innovative idea to bring social 
entrepreneurs into Kansas City homes rent-free to take advantage of Google Fiber and start new 
companies called Homes For Hackers). 
 136.  Ogden Publications, Inc., Find a B Corp, BCORPORATION.NET, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/community/ogden-publications-inc (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 137.  OGDEN PUBLICATIONS, http://www.ogdenpubs.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
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company, became B Corp certified in April 2011, and Arnold 
Development Group, a real estate investment and development firm that 
creates mixed-use walkable neighborhoods, became B Corp certified in 
November 2011. 
The brilliance of the benefit corporation legislation is that it bypasses 
the debate of to what extent corporations should act ethically and instead, 
recognizing that a growing number of entrepreneurs are seeking to create 
socially-focused for-profit companies, creates an entirely voluntary 
process by which corporations and investors can choose to be held to 
higher levels of accountability.  The legislation uses free market 
principles to allow a new type of for-profit business model to flourish 
while also addressing social issues.  South Carolina Representative 
Tommy Stringer (R), who introduced the recently enacted benefit 
corporation legislation in South Carolina, pointed to the potential for 
private enterprises to address social problems: 
By passing the South Carolina Benefit Corporation Act, we have joined 
the vanguard of states that are looking beyond government programs to 
solve our social problems.  This inventive legislation will unleash the 
generosity of existing South Carolina businesses who wish to promote 
their commitment to corporate responsibility.  Furthermore, this 
legislation enhances our ability to attract new businesses to our state 
that are willing to invest in our future.
138
 
It reduces the potential for litigation by ensuring that investors and 
directors are on the same page in terms of commitment to the company’s 
mission and opens up new potential funding sources as the number of 
investors looking for social impact in addition to financial return grows. 
2. Delaware Corporate Law 
Although Kansas traditionally follows Delaware corporate law,
139
 the 
State of Kansas has a unique set of policy considerations that do not 
affect the State of Delaware.  Because of these unique considerations, 
Kansas has adopted legislation that differs from Delaware.  For example, 
because of Kansas’s strong ties with family farmers, the State—along 
                                                          
 138.  Rep. Tommy Stringer, SC Benefit Corporation Bill Signed into Law, 
TOMMYSTRINGER.COM (June 15, 2012), http://www.tommystringer.com/2012/06/15/benefit-
corporation-bill-signed-into-law.  
 139.  Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 975 
(2006) (stating that Kansas has “consciously chosen to follow Delaware’s lead in business 
legislation” and citing examples of Kansas courts articulating this choice).  
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with many other large agricultural states—has laws regulating corporate 
ownership of farming land.
140
  Also, Kansas adopted the Business Entity 
Transactions Act
141
 three years ago rather than adopt Delaware’s 
provisions separately addressing various mixed entity transactions.
142
 
Delaware recently passed its own version of benefit corporation 
legislation.
143
 Rather than follow the model legislation, Delaware came 
up with its own version of the legislation, with many of the essential 
requirements stripped out.  Most importantly, the Delaware legislation 
makes a third-party standard optional,
144
 reduces the reporting 
requirement to biennially and only to shareholders,
145
 and requires a 
specific public benefit purpose rather than a general public benefit 
requirement.
146
  The Delaware version includes other variations from the 
model, including: a requirement of 90% shareholder approval to become 
a public benefit corporation;
147
 dissenters’ rights for shareholders voting 
“no” to public benefit corporation status;
148
 a majority vote (rather than a 
two-thirds vote requirement) to approve the merger or sale of the 
company;
149
 and the requirement that the corporation include “PBC” or 
some variant in its legal name.
150
 
The first two important changes are the lack of a third-party standard 
requirement and the lack of a public reporting requirement, which are 
cornerstones of the model legislation.  As previously mentioned, the 
third-party standard has been the subject of criticism because of the 
possibility for abuse.  These concerns, however, stem from the 
possibility that a company could seek out a weak standard to use in 
annual reporting rather than a well-respected third-party standard.  This 
concern about potential “greenwashing” becomes particularly well-
founded when there is no third-party standard requirement at all.  
                                                          
 140.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901 to -5909; see Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate 
Agriculture: Anticorporate Farming Statutes and Production Contracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 400 
(1992) (stating that the block of nine Midwestern states with anti-corporate farming statutes could be 
considered the “anticorporate farming zone”).  
 141.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-78-101 to -78-607. 
 142.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 254, 263–266, 388–390; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-
209, 18-212 to -214, 18-216. 
 143.  tit. 8, §§ 361–368. 
 144.  tit. 8, § 366(c). 
 145.  § 366(b), (c). 
 146.  § 362(a). 
 147.  § 363(a). 
 148.  § 363(b). 
 149.  § 363(c). 
 150.  § 362(c). 
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Combined with the lack of public reporting requirements and the Public 
Benefit Corporation (or PBC) naming convention, the lack of third-party 
standards creates the likelihood that a company could misrepresent its 
overall social, environmental, and governance achievements while 
benefiting from the “PBC” brand.  The combination of these provisions 
has the potential to significantly undermine public transparency and 
accountability, two tenants of the model legislation. 
The third important divergence from the model legislation is the 
specific public benefit purpose requirement.  Unlike California’s Flexible 
Purpose Corporation, which allows for a narrow purpose only, the 
Delaware legislation, while requiring a specific public purpose, also 
contains overarching language that may, in fact, be more stringent than 
even the model legislation’s “general purpose” requirement.  The 
Delaware law requires directors to “manage or direct the business and 
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances (1) the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, (2) the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and (3) the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”
151
  So, although the statute requires a specific public 
benefit, it requires directors to “balance” the interests of shareholders, 
stakeholders, and the public benefit(s).  By contrast, the model 
legislation only requires directors to “consider” the interests of a list of 
stakeholders. 
Despite Kansas’s history in following Delaware’s corporate law, 
there are good reasons to instead pass a modified version of Delaware’s 
public benefit corporation legislation.  Colorado recently passed a 
version similar to the Delaware version, except it includes annual public 
reporting requirements and, at least implicitly, requires a third-party 
standard.
152
  Kansas, like Delaware, does not have a constituency statute 
protecting directors of dual-mission companies.  The emergence of social 
enterprises in recent years puts Kansas at a distinct disadvantage in 
attracting any market share in this emerging sector.  Kansas should 
therefore consider adopting a version of the model legislation or version 
similar to Colorado’s with explicit provisions requiring an independent 
third-party standard. 
                                                          
 151.  § 365(a).  
 152.  H.B. 13-1138, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2013).  
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3.  Recommended Provisions 
To maximize the value of benefit corporation legislation, both to 
social enterprises and to Kansas, the following recommendations should 
be included in any provisions adopted by the State.  First, the legislation 
should include dissenters’ rights both in the context of traditional 
corporations switching to benefit corporation status and for benefit 
corporations switching to traditional corporation status.  Second, Kansas 
should only adopt the requirement of a designated benefit director if 
additional qualifications are included.  Third, the legislation should allow 
only a select few third party standards and require annual benefit reports 
be recorded within a public database. 
a.  Dissenters’ Rights 
Although the model legislation is thorough, most states have adopted 
a version of the model legislation to suit their own needs and address 
concerns.  California, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Colorado are the 
only states to adopt dissenters’ rights for shareholders opposed to the 
transition to a benefit corporation.  In California, dissenting shareholders 
who oppose the transition to or from benefit corporation status have 
appraisal rights.
153
  The risk in not adopting dissenters’ rights, in addition 
to undermining the overall goal of aligning shareholder and director 
interests, is an increased risk of litigation from the dissenting 
shareholders.
154
  On the other hand, allowing dissenters’ rights for all 
minority shareholders makes it difficult for cash-strapped start-ups and 
early stage companies to elect benefit corporation status.
155
 
Although adopting dissenters’ rights may dissuade some companies 
from electing benefit corporation status, the potential cost of litigation far 
outweighs the cost of any cash payout to dissenting shareholders.  Most 
companies interested in becoming benefit corporations are socially 
conscious companies with strong ethical and philanthropic goals.  These 
companies likely have investors and shareholders who support the ethical 
focus of the company and are less likely to object to its electing benefit 
corporation status.  Despite this, a corporation with profit as its primary 
                                                          
 153.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14603–14604 (2012).  
 154.  See Murray, supra note 34, at 36 (warning that states that do not adopt dissenters’ rights are 
“likely to face lawsuits from shareholders who object to the altering of the fundamental nature of 
their investment”).  
 155.  BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 27. 
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purpose, and social benefit second, is a profoundly different 
investment—and may generate a very different rate of return—than a 
corporation that puts the two on par or elevates social benefit above 
profit.  Likewise, a benefit corporation transitioning to a traditional 
corporation is a fundamentally different investment for a shareholder 
who values transparency, accountability, and social impact. 
Kansas should consider adopting dissenters’ rights in both contexts, 
but only if there is no accessible marketplace to sell the shares.  For 
example, dissenting shareholders of publicly traded companies would not 
be afforded the extra protection of appraisal rights.  Admittedly, adopting 
dissenters’ rights disproportionately affects small growing companies 
unable to buy back dissenting shares.  Despite this, it is in the State’s best 
interest to reduce the potential for litigation and protect and encourage 
investment.  These public policy rationales outweigh the provision’s 
potential for inhibiting adoption by a select few companies. 
b. Benefit Director 
The requirement of a benefit director—an independent director 
charged with writing an opinion as to whether the corporation, directors, 
and officers complied with the general and specific benefit 
requirements—should only be adopted if additional qualifications are 
included.
156
  The model legislation requires that the benefit director be 
independent but allows the person to serve simultaneously as benefit 
officer.
157
  The benefit officer is charged with the duty of preparing the 
benefit report.
158
  To prepare a report articulating the achievements and 
setbacks in pursuing benefit goals, the officer would need to be 
intimately involved in the day-to-day operations and strategic plans of 
the corporation.  One person holding both positions of director and 
benefit officer necessarily creates a conflict of interest by effectively 
eliminating the requirement that the benefit director be independent.
159
 
While the benefit director provision was included to add an 
additional layer of transparency, it may have the opposite effect.
160
  
                                                          
 156.  Cf. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302 (B Lab 2013) (permitting, but not 
requiring, the appointment of a benefit director). 
 157.  § 302(b). 
 158.  § 304(b)(2). 
 159.  See § 102 (defining “Independent” as “having no material relationship with the benefit 
corporation” but excluding benefit directors and officers). 
 160. § 302 cmt. at 16–17  (“The statement of the benefit director required by subsection (c) is an 
important part of the transparency required under this chapter.”). 
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Particularly in a small corporation, every director and officer should 
stand behind the benefit report and be aware of the benefit activities of 
the corporation.  Dedicating one director as the spokesperson and 
certifier of the benefit report may deflect attention away from other 
directors and officers and potentially make the benefit director a target 
for replacement when benefit activities do not meet shareholders’ 
expectations.
161
  The benefit director may consequently be placed in the 
position of blaming other directors and officers for their failure to meet 
benefit goals, or risk replacement.  If the reasons for a poor benefit report 
are systemic, replacing the benefit director would do little in the way of 
remedying the problem but may allow the corporation to avoid 
answering to shareholders in the short term. 
If the goal of the benefit director is to enhance accountability, then 
the provision should include specific qualifications for the independent 
director.  The provision could require, for example, that the benefit 
director be knowledgeable about or have prior experience with the third-
party standard used to create the report.  Otherwise, the director’s 
opinion is of little value to shareholders.  States considering including the 
benefit director position in the legislation should include additional 
qualification requirements, disallow the same person serving as benefit 
officer, and exempt small corporations—whether or not a statutory close 
corporation—from the requirement.
162
  Alternatively, Kansas can choose 
to follow the approach taken by Delaware and Colorado and leave these 
provisions out. 
c. Enforcement and Accounting 
To avoid the potential of benefit corporations adopting weak third-
party standards, Kansas should consider amending the third-party 
standard requirement by adopting a few specific standards that meet the 
statutory criteria of comprehensiveness, credibility, independence, and 
transparency.  Understandably, B Lab has refrained from promoting its 
own metrics as the only possible third-party standard so as to avoid 
accusations that it is acting in self-interest with the legislative effort.  The 
                                                          
 161. § 302(c) (requiring the benefit director to include a statement of opinion as to whether the 
benefit corporation fulfilled its general and specific benefit goals). 
 162.  States excluding the benefit director requirement include: California, Maryland, New York, 
and Virginia. States that have included a benefit director requirement include: Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont. See J. Haskell Murray, Benefit 
Corporations—State Statute Comparison Chart (Jan. 1, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 (last updated Dec. 6, 2012). 
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reality, however, is that passage of the legislation in numerous states will 
spur many new companies—and not all of them an experienced nonprofit 
like B Lab—to create third-party certifications and assessments. 
It would be wise for Kansas to adopt a few proven third-party 
standards and periodically review them to include additional industry-
specific standards as needed.  For example, because a benefit corporation 
is not required to obtain certification, but rather is required to use third-
party standards to do a self-assessment, it makes sense that states adopt 
third-party standards providers who offer use of the standards without 
charge.  Currently B Lab and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) offer 
their assessment tools without charge.
163
  Certifications or third-party 
standards assessments, other than those approved by the State, may be 
valuable to benefit corporations but ideally would not impact whether a 
company maintains benefit corporation status. 
Requiring benefit corporations to use the standards put in place by 
one of only a few well-established third-party organizations would make 
it easier to implement a judicial remedy for shareholder suits (benefit 
enforcement proceedings).  Specifically, rather than being limited to 
injunctive relief, courts would be able to require benefit corporations to 
bear the cost of a third-party audit in response to claims that the company 
has failed to serve a general public benefit.  Adopting third-party 
standards of organizations that are capable of performing thorough 
independent audits and allowing an audit as a potential judicial remedy 
will give shareholder investors extra assurance that the corporation is 
fulfilling its dual mission and is accurately representing its efforts in 
annual reports. 
Kansas should also consider requiring that benefit corporations 
register with the Attorney General’s office, in the same way that 
charitable organizations do, by filing a copy of the annual benefit report 
with the office.
164
  This central database would aid consumers in 
verifying benefit corporations and allow them to compare socially-
focused organizations before investing or donating.  Also, it would help 
the State and others track compliance with the annual benefit report 
requirement and create easy access to data on the measurable social, 
community, or environmental impact of registered benefit corporations. 
Benefit corporation incentives are also gaining popularity.  San 
                                                          
 163.  BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 24. 
 164.  Illinois recently added such a registration requirement to benefit corporation legislation 
passed August 2012 (effective January 1, 2013). S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb, (Ill. 2012). 
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Francisco and Philadelphia now offer certain financial incentives to 
benefit corporations and a few universities have begun tuition 
forgiveness programs for students who go to work for benefit 
corporations.  If the Kansas government or if other institutions in the 
State desire to offer tax advantages or other financial incentives to these 
types of social enterprises to encourage their growth, defined third-party 
standards will enable them to identify fraud or track and regulate 
businesses receiving incentives.  Offering tax breaks or financial 
incentives, including encouraging local government product and service 
appropriation, could increase the desirability of incorporating in Kansas. 
States that are resistant to the new legislation will likely be at a 
distinct disadvantage when it comes to attracting market share in this 
emerging sector of social enterprise.  Encouraging social enterprises may 
help states address pressing societal needs that are not fully met by non-
profit assistance and government programs.  For example, B Corp 
certified companies are 55% more likely to cover some of the cost of 
insurance for their employees and 68% more likely to donate 10% or 
more of their profits to charity each year.
165
  Social businesses are more 
likely to put offices in low socio-economic areas, like inner cities, and to 
engage with the community to address issues of poverty or education.
166
  
Innovative young thinkers are even willing to take a pay cut to work for 
socially responsible businesses.
167
  Cultivating a climate open to social 
enterprise is one step toward attracting intellectual capital to the State.  
Tying incentives to local social benefits would help attract socially 
motivated companies to Kansas and help to address some of the State’s 
pressing social needs.  Eliminating legal barriers that exist for social 
enterprises is one step toward growing local economies and creating 
more jobs. 
Benefit corporation legislation has passed with bi-partisan support in 
every state that has adopted it.  It costs the states little to nothing, has the 
                                                          
 165.  The Evolution of an Entity: A Closer Look at Benefit Corporations, SOCENTLAW.COM, 
http://socentlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Final-B-Corp-Infographic1.jpg (last accessed 
Nov. 13, 2013). 
 166.  See, e.g., Blanca Torres, IPO ignites “Pandora Effect” in Oakland, SAN FRANCISCO 
BUSINESS TIMES (June 15, 2011, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2011/06/pandora-ipo-oakland-office-
space.html?page=all. 
 167.  See New MBAs Would Sacrifice Pay for Ethics, THE DAILY STAT, HARVARD BUSINESS 
REVIEW (May 17, 2011), http://web.hbr.org/email/archive/dailystat.php?date=051711 (finding that 
graduating MBAs would take a salary reduction of over $8,000 a year to work for ethical 
companies). 
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potential to attract growing businesses and start-ups, and is completely 
voluntary for companies and shareholders alike.  The legislation, in other 
words, is non-threatening.  By creating distinct provisions under state 
corporate law in which shareholders, officers, and directors must 
affirmatively choose to participate, it avoids the intense ethical debate of 
whether corporations should be socially responsible.  The legislation 
does not impose ethical obligations on existing corporations, nor does it 
imply that all corporations should be benefit corporations.  Instead, it 
allows lawmakers to recognize the growing social enterprise movement 
while eliminating barriers to continued growth and leaving it up to the 
market to do the rest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although benefit corporations are relatively new and untested, there 
is a growing demand for socially conscious businesses and a need for 
new legal business forms to accommodate them.  Businesses that are 
firmly committed to pursuing social and environmental benefits should 
not be intimidated by traditional corporate norms and forced to bypass 
their mission for fear of litigation.  Regardless of the specific legal reality 
faced by individual businesses, there is a strong and persistent 
assumption that profit maximization is the primary and central purpose 
of the corporation.  Benefit corporation legislation includes a clear 
articulation of fiduciary duty by mandating the consideration of more 
than profit when making decisions.  This clear articulation, along with a 
public benefit requirement, serves as notice to potential investors that the 
corporation, at minimum, will not make decisions to increase 
profitability if the decision will have a negative impact on society or the 
environment and, at maximum, may make decisions that reduce 
profitability in order to provide a public benefit. 
Given the spike in socially conscious investors and funds, a clear 
framework for socially minded businesses allows access to financing that 
may be more patient and is closely aligned with the goals of the 
organization.  The certainty of the legal framework should encourage 
businesses to scale and take on additional investors, and encourage 
entrepreneurs to create more socially focused businesses. 
The benefit corporation gives social enterprises a way to differentiate 
themselves from other corporations that have large marketing budgets 
and make misleading claims about social and environmental 
responsibility.  Benefit corporation legislation is a way for companies to 
embrace the social responsibility claims that many companies make—to 
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“walk the walk” rather than just “talk the talk.”  As with any new 
legislation, benefit corporation statutes will certainly create some 
questions about how the statutes will apply in certain situations and how 
courts will interpret them.  In particular, additional checks on the third-
party standard providers or acceptable third-party standards will likely be 
required, although Kansas has the opportunity to limit potential misuse 
of the third-party standard requirement at adoption of the legislation.  
Despite its uncertainties, benefit corporation legislation takes an 
important step toward recognizing and encouraging an emerging sector 
of innovation and entrepreneurial spirit, and has the potential to alter the 
landscape of corporate America. 
